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COMPELLING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER
SECTION 106) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) grants employees the right
to form or participate in collective labor organizations.' A common organi-
zational process by which a union can become the certified bargaining
representative for the employees of a nonunion shop initially involves the
signing of authorization cards by the employees. 2 Once a majority of em-
ployees in an appropriate bargaining unit3 has signed union authorization
cards, the union may demand that the employer bargain with the union
as the legitimate representative of the employees. If the employer refuses
to bargain with the union after a majority of signed authorization cards has
been obtained,4 the organizing union generally will petition the National
' Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976), states in relevant part: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing ....
2 The procedure for the signing of authorization cards is set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 101.17
(1978). The signed authorization cards either will authorize the union to seek an election or
will authorize the union to actually represent the employees. Virtually all union authorization
cards authorize actual representation and thus more clearly indicate union support. However,
the reliability of authorization cards has been called into question. See Comment, Union
Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L. J. 805, 818-44 (1966). The acceptance of authorization cards
to indicate majority support requires the assumption that the cards accurately represent the
employees' sentiments. Employee sentiments may not be accurately represented by the
cards, however, because the solicitation of these cards is virtually unregulated. Ambiguous
or obscure wording, and pressure to sign from co-workers may result in an inaccurate por-
trayal of employee sentiments. See NLRB v. Johnnie's Poultry Co., 344 F.2d 617, 620 (8th
Cir. 1965). See also Note, The Use of Section 10(j) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
in Employer Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 845, 859 [hereinafter referred to as
Refusal-To-Bargain Cases]. Use of authorization cards may not allow the employee to decide
freely whether to support unionization. Thus, certification elections, see NLRB Statement
of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 101.19 (1978), remain the judicially preferred means of validating
a union's majority status insofar as a secret ballot election provides much greater protection
for the employees' right to freedom of choice. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
602 (1969). Nevertheless, in Gissel the Supreme Court approved the use of authorization cards
as valid indicators of union support under certain circumstances. Id. at 616. See text accom-
panying notes 19-22 infra.
3 The NLRB has the responsibility to determine whether the employees which the union
claims to represent constitute an appropriate bargaining unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
The right of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
is dependent upon the Board's finding that the organizing unit is appropriate for representa-
tion. See Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 152-53 (1941). To decide whether
a particular group of employees constitute an appropriate bargaining unit, the NLRB may
consider factors such as homogeneity of the group, the similarity of job and functions, the
extent of common supervision, and the history of bargaining within the company or industry.
See generally Smith Steel Workers v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 420 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1969);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408, 1412-18 (1966).
1 Previously, under the Rule of Joy Silk, an employer could refuse to bargain only if he
had a good faith doubt as to the validity of the union's majority. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85
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Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)5 for a certification election6 to
verify the union's majority support. If the certification election verifies the
union's majority, an employer's continued refusal to bargain will consti-
tute a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.7 The NLRB may then issue
an order under section 10(c) of the NLRA8 directing the employer to bar-
gain with the union.
Complications arise in the unionization process when in opposition to
the union's organizational attempts, the employer uses coercive practices
to undermine and dissipate union support.9 Section 8 of the NLRA explic-
itly proscribes these practices'0 and section 10 empowers the NLRB to
remedy these unfair labor practices." Unfair labor practices may tend to
weaken union support and may preclude the possibility of holding a fair
representation election.'2 In such circumstances, the union, rather than
N.L.R.B. 1263, 1276 (1949). Absent a good faith doubt, refusal to bargain would constitute
an unfair labor practice. Id. The Joy Silk doctrine has been abandoned and no violation of
the NLRA occurs simply because an employer refuses to accept the card majority and bargain
with the union. In such instances, the union has the burden of invoking the Board's election
procedures. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 303-10 (1974);
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 592-95 (1969); Aaron Bros., Corp., 223 N.L.R.B.
1077, 1078 (1976).
The NLRB consists of five members appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). The NLRB is responsible for the enforcement
of the NLRA and for remedying unfair labor practices. The Board delegates this authority to
regional directors throughout the country with whom unfair labor practice charges are ini-
tially filed. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976).
See NLRB Statement of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 101.19 (1978).
7 See note 10 infra.
I The issuance of bargaining orders is authorized under § 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1976). Section 10(c) states that the Board shall issue and cause to be served an order
requiring such persons who have committed unfair labor practices to cease and desist from
such unfair labor practice, and to take such action as will effectuate the policies of this Act.
A bargaining order under § 10(c) requires that upon the union's request, an employer must
bargain collectively in good faith with the union as the exclusive representative of the employ-
ees concerning pay, wages and hours of employment; and if an understanding is reached, to
embody it in a signed agreement. For a discussion of the circumstances which justify a 10(c)
bargaining order see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-15 (1969); Walgreen Co.
v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014, 1017-19 (7th Cir. 1975).
1 Typical of antiunion practices which tend to dissipate union support are threats of lay-
offs, terminations or other reprisals, coercive interrogation of employees as to suspected union
activity, promises of benefits or pay increases to discourage unionization, and threats of plant
closings. See 29 LA. L. Rav. 46 (1969); 7 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 110 (1971).
,0 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), prohibits employers from
interfering with employees' exercise of § 7 unionization rights. See note 1 supra. Section
8(a)(3) prohibits employers from making any condition of employment dependent upon union
activity. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) prohibits an employer from refusing to
bargain collectively with the legitimate representative of his employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1976).
" The NLRB is able to remedy unfair labor practices through cease and desist orders,
restraining orders, rerun elections, and injunctions. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
,1 The unions contend that an employee confronted with antiunion tactics inevitably
may be compelled to vote against the union for fear of job loss or other reprisals, thus
impairing the election's fairness. However, since certification elections are conducted by
secret ballot, see 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1976), employees have no reason to fear reprisals unless
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petition the NLRB to hold a certification election,"3 may file an unfair
labor practice charge against the employer that alleges the commission of
at least one unfair labor practice. 4 Filing such a complaint initiates the
Board's administrative proceedings which include investigations and hear-
ings to determine the legitimacy of the alleged charges.' 5
When the Board ultimately finds that unfair labor practices have un-
dermined a union's majority and thus have made the holding of a fair
election unlikely, or where such practices have caused a previously held
election to be set aside as invalid," the NLRB may properly issue a bar-
gaining order under section 10(c) of the NLRA17 despite the fact that the
union has never been certified as the legitimate representative of the em-
ployees. 8 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,"' the seminal case regarding
bargaining orders, the Supreme Court held that a bargaining order is an
appropriate remedy for an employer's refusal to bargain where unfair labor
practices have undermined and dissipated a union's majority, thus render-
the employer has threatened to cease operations completely if the union prevails. While an
employer's antiunion activity inherently amounts to tampering with the electoral certifica-
tion process, it may or may not be an infringement upon the employees' rights to freedom of
choice as guaranteed by § 7 of the NLRA. Only if there is a causual relationship between the
employer's misconduct and election results which are unfavorable to the union will the
election process have been damaged.
11 If the union decides to petition the NLRB for a certification election, and subsequently
loses the election, the union is not without recourse. The NLRB may set aside the results of
a certification election in which employer or union misconduct has destroyed the election's
fairness. 29 C.F.R. § 101.19 (1978). See also Bernel Foam Prod. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 1281
(1964); 29 C.F.R. § 101.21 (1978). The corrective functions of the Board are based on the
premise that certification elections should be held in laboratory conditions to ensure the
employees a fair and free choice in determining whether they desire representation and in
choosing their representatives. See NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 300 F.2d 273, 278
(5th Cir. 1962). Upon determining that a previous election was uinfair, the NLRB may invali-
date the election results and order a new election to be held, or may order the parties to
bargain without the union ever having been certified as the legitimate representative of the
employees. See text accompanying notes 19-22 infra.
" An unfair labor practice charge must be filed with the regional director for the region
in which the alleged violations have occurred. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1978).
" At the conclusion of the investigations and the hearings before an administrative law
judge, the judge will prepare a decision stating findings of the fact, conclusions, and reasons
for his determinations on all material issues. The parties may accept and comply with these
findings or may file exceptions to the decision with the NLRB. Sie generally NLRB State-
ment of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.2-.16 (1978) (describing unfair labor practices proceed-
ings).
' See note 13 supra.
'7 See note 8 supra.
J' NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 375 (1969).
" Id. Gissel was a consolidation of four separate cases in which unfair labor practices
were alleged. Each of the cases involved charges of § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(5) violations and two
of the cases involved an additional § 8(a)(3) violation. See note 10 supra. In two of the cases
the union lost certification elections which were subsequently invalidated because of the
employer's unfair labor practices. In the other two cases, no certification elections were held
as a result of employer misconduct. 395 U.S. at 579-83. See generally Lewis, Gissel Packing:
Was the Supreme Court Right?, 56 A.B.A. L.J. 877 (1970); 50 B.U.L. Rav. 111 (1970); 21 Cksa
W. L. REv. 305 (1970).
1979]
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ing the holding of a fair election highly unlikely.20
The Gissel decision states that an employer who has engaged in unfair
labor practices may under certain circumstances be required to bargain
with an uncertified union.21 In many cases the final bargaining order will
not issue, however, until as many as two years after the filing of the original
complaint," and employers may often take advantage of this delay to
further undermine the union's majority strength.
In addition, further procedural delays are possible once the Board has
issued a bargaining order insofar as a bargaining order issued by the NLRB
is not self-enforcing. If an employer does not comply voluntarily with a
bargaining order,2 the Board must petition a court of appeals to enforce
its directives. 24 The court of appeals will review the situation and may or
may not enforce the Board's order.2 Enforcement proceedings in a court
395 U.S. at 575. In Gissel, the Supreme Court held that a union may establish its
majority status through obtaining signed authorization cards from a majority of employees.
Id. at 601-10. While acknowledging that certification elections are the preferred means of
establishing a union's majority status, the Court recognized the practical unworkability of
the election method when an employer's misconduct would seriously impede the election's
fairness. Id. at 610-12. Thus, bargaining orders were found to be a proper remedial procedure.
The Gissel Court justified this finding on the grounds that alternative remedies such as cease
and desist orders would not protect the employees' right to determine if they desire represen-
tation and would allow the employer to benefit from his unlawful refusal to bargain. Id. at
610-16. The Supreme Court reasoned that once an employer has succeeded in undermining a
union's strength, he would probably obey a cease and desist order since the damage to union
strength already would have been done. Id. at 612.
11 Id. at 610-12. Recognizing the wide spectrum of unfair labor practices and the diverse
effects that such practices might have on the certification election process, the Gissel Court
delineated three categories of unfair labor practices, two of which would justify a bargaining
order. Id. at 613-15. The first category involves clearly extraordinary cases of outrageous and
pervasive unfair labor practices whose coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the applica-
tion of traditional remedies. In such cases a bargaining order may issue even in the absence
of specific § 8(a)(5) violations or a bargaining demand from the union. Id. at 614. See J.C.
Penney Co., Inc., 384 F.2d 479, 485 (10th Cir. 1967). In J. C. Penney, the granting of pervasive
unilateral wage increases designed to destroy the union's majority was found to be so hostile
to the union's interest and so outrageous that a bargaining order was justified. Id. at 482-86.
More commonplace are cases which fit into the second Gissel categorization. In such cases,
the employer is guilty of less pervasive and less outrageous practices, which nevertheless tend
to undermine the union's strength and impede the election process. Under these circumstan-
ces, a bargaining order may be an appropriate remedy upon showing that the union once
enjoyed majority suppor. 395 U.S. at 614-15. See Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014, 1017
(7th Cir. 1975). The third Gissel categorization involves minor violations which because of
their minimal impact on the election process will not sustain a bargaining order. 395 U.S. at
615. See Meatcutters Local 576 v. NLRB, 516 F.2d 1244, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2 The relative slowness of the NLRB's hearing procedures often causes lengthy delays
in the issuance of a final bargaining order. See, e.g., Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d
33, 38 (2d Cir. 1975), which exemplifies the possible delays.
" Even if the employer clearly has committed unfair labor practices, the employer may
not comply voluntarily with the bargaining order. It is reasonable to assume that there may
be a strong economic incentive for the employer to delay union recognition and collective
bargaining since an agreement inevitably could reflect an increase in salaries or benefits.
2, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
The court of appeals may remand the case to the Board to consider additional material
evidence or changed circumstances, to make further findings on evidence already received,
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of appeals result in even longer delays. Thus, a Gissel bargaining order,
though designed to protect an employee's unionization rights, often may
be an inadequate remedy 8 because of the procedural delays inherent in the
administrative process.Y Recognizing this fact,the NLRB occasionally has
utilized section 10() of the NLRA2 to maintain a union's viability and to
protect the rights of employees.
Section 10(j) of the NLRA permits the Board to petition in federal
district court for appropriate temporary injunctive relief to restrain an
employer from engaging in unfair labor practices.29 Section 10(j) provides
the district court with broad discretionary injunctive authority to prevent
labor related misconduct or to compel labor related action." Under section
to clarify the record, or to take further action in accordance with the applicable law. See Ford
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 368-76 (1939). The court may remand the case in its
entirety or issue a partial remand only involving certain portions of the order. See NLRB v.
Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F.2d 681, 689-90 (lst Cir. 1940). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(d)-
(f) (1976).
' As the processing of a Gissel-type complaint is relatively slow, see note 27 infra, an
employer's noncompliance with the NLRB's bargaining order will often result in a protracted
continuation of § 8 violations. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). While it may be argued that a tradi-
tional cease and desist order will prevent continued § 8 violations during the processing of
an unfair labor practice complaint, the long delays inherent in the Board's administrative
procedures and in the subsequent judicial appeals may cause the dissipation of union support
through normal turnover in the work force. However, normal work force turnover is to be
expected and there is no reason to assume that the incoming workers would be any less
amenable to the prospect of unionization than the workers whom they replace.
" In fiscal 1975, the average processing time in unfair labor practice cases from the filing
of the charge to the final Board decision was 344 days. From a final Board decision to a
decision in the court of appeals averaged another 380 days. H.R. REP. No. 9069, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 32821 3296, 3332 (1975).
29 U.S.C. § 160() (1976) states in relevant part:
The Board shall have power ... to petition any United States district court, .
wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred . . . for
appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such peti-
tion the court shall cause notice thereof to be served. . . and thereupon shall have
jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it
deems just and proper. (Emphasis added.)
1 Section 10(j) of the NLRA grants to the NLRB the authority to seek temporary injunc-
tive relief to remedy any kind of unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976). Section 10(j)
has been used to enjoin interference with employees' right to organize, Angel v. Sacks, 382
F.2d 655, 661 (10th Cir. 1967), to enjoin recognition of a union other than the certified union,
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 271 (8th Cir. 1967), to order reinstate-
ment of discharged employees, Reynolds v. Curley Printing Co., 247 F. Supp. 317, 323-24
(M.D. Tenn. 1965), and to enjoin refusal to bargain collectively, Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc.,
517 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Siegel, Section 10(j) of the National Labor
Relations Act: Suggested Reforms For An Expanded Use, 13 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 457
(1972) (discussing 10(j) injunctions).
11 See note 29 supra. Section 10(j) injunctions must be distinguished from injunctions
issued under § 10(l). 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976). Under § 10(l), whenever the NLRB has
reasonable cause to believe that certain enumerated unfair labor practices have occurred, the
Board must petition for injunctive relief. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). The mandatory petition-
ing for injunctive relief under § 10(l) applies only to unfair labor practices committed by labor
organizations or their agents and does not encompass the violations which would lead to the
Board's petitioning for a 10(j) injunction.
19791
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8 of the NLRA, an employer's refusal or failure to bargain with the legiti-
mate representatives of his employees constitutes an unfair labor practice
subject to the normal remedial processes of the NLRB.31 However, the use
of section 10(j) injunctions to compel an employer to bargain with an
uncertified union in Gissel-type situations pending adjudication of unfair
labor practice allegations before the Board is highly controversial.32 The
Board has petitioned for 10(j) injunctive relief sparingly in Gissel situa-
tions, and the courts are divided on the propriety of such action.
3
In enacting section 10(j) in 1947,11 Congress sought to provide a means
whereby the NLRB could ensure that the remedial objectives of the NLRA
would not be frustrated by the delays inherent in the administrative pro-
cess.3 Despite the clear legislative intent, considerable disagreement exists
concerning what constitutes frustration of the NLRA and the proper scope
of injunctive relief. While courts generally agree that a labor injunction is
an extraordinary remedy,3 the courts are divided with regard to what
constitutes the extraordinary circumstances necessary to warrant the judi-
cial intervention of granting an NLRB petition for a section 10(j) injunc-
tion .
3
31 See note 10 supra.
n Somewhat less controversial is the propriety of § 10(j) injunctions which compel bar-
gaining involving a formerly existing union as opposed to an uncertified union in Gissel
situations. Whereas authorization cards are the only evidence of majority support that an
organizing union may claim, a preexisting union has the benefit of once having been certified
as the legitimate representative of the employees. Thus, courts generally have been more
likely to grant injunctive relief in cases involving a preexisting union than in cases involving
an organizing union. See generally Levine v. White-Westinghouse Corp., 92 L.R.R.M. 3499,
3501 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (bargaining order injunction granted). Contra, Hirsch v. Pick-Mt.
Laurel Corp., 436 F. Supp. 1342, 1350-53 (D.N.J. 1977) (bargaining order injunction denied).
3 Since 1971 there have been only five reported § 10(j) bargaining order decisions in
Gissel-type situations. Bargaining order relief has been granted in Seeler v. Trading Port,
Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975) and in Smith v. Old Angus, Inc., 82 L.R.R.M. 2930 (D.C.
Md. 1973). Bargaining order relief was denied in Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d
1185 (5th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976), Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp.
385 (D. Mass. 1973), and Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. 2600 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
" Prior to enactment of § 10(j), federal courts were deprived of jurisdiction to issue
injunctions in labor disputes by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-15 (1976).
The congressional intent in enacting § 10(j) is indicated in S. RFP. No. 105,80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8, 27 (1947). This report emphasizes that, since time is of the essence in unfair labor
practice proceedings, the slow procedures of the NLRB followed by lengthy appeals in the
circuit courts fall short of achieving the desired objective of the NLRA. This objective is the
prompt elimination of the obstructions to the free flow of commerce and the encouragement
of collective bargaining. Thus, Congress provided that the Board may seek injunctive relief
to preclude persons violating the Act from accomplishing their unlawful objectives prior to
being placed under any legal restraint. Id.
" See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1967) (§ 10(j)
is reserved for serious and extraordinary set of circumstances); Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356
F. Supp. 385, 387 (D. Mass. 1973) (reasonable cause to believe that the NLRA has been
violated is not sufficient to issue a § 10() injunction).
1 Courts have looked to varying criteria to determine whether injunctive relief is proper.
Cf. Angel v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655, 660-61 (10th Cir. 1967) (frustration of the purposes of the
. [Vol. XXXVI
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Before filing a petition for section 10(j) relief, the NLRB makes a pre-
liminary determination as to the seriousness of the alleged violations. The
Board initially must take into account the likely effect of the alleged viola-
tions absent injunctive relief. 8 Once the NLRB has decided that the cir-
cumstances warrant the institution of a 10(j) proceeding, the district court
must determine the propriety of issuing the injunction. In general, courts
will apply a two-part test to ascertain the validity of the Board's petition.
First, a court must find reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor
practice has been committe4.39 To make this determination the district
court only need decide that the Board's theories of law and fact are not
insubstantial or frivolous." Given the serious nature of the alleged viola-
tions necessary to precipitate an NLRB petition seeking 10(j) injunctive
relief, a finding of reasonable cause is virtually assured.4 In addition to a
finding of reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have been
committed, there also must be a finding that the relief sought is "just and
proper" as required by the statute."2 This second requirement has led to
significant differences in the analysis and ultimate decisions of courts re-
viewing NLRB petitions seeking 10(j) injunctions.
Courts have relied on one or more of three primary bases of inquiry to
determine whether section 10(j) relief is just and proper.4 3 Each basis of
NLRA and inadequacy of the final remedy); Squillacote v. International Union, 384 F. Supp.
1171, 1174-75 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (public interest and preservation of the status quo). See
generally Note, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181 (1969).
31 The NLRB has set forth its standards for determining whether to petition for § 10(j)
relief. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976). See General Council Report of August 14, 1975, quoted in
Solien v. Merchants Home Delivery Service, Inc., 557 F.2d 622, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1977). The
major consideration is whether the unlawful conduct is likely to frustrate the Board's reme-
dial processes in the absence of injunctive relief. Such a determination may depend on
whether the unfair labor practices involved can be remedied and the status quo restored by
a Board order and its subsequent enforcement by a court of appeals. Other considerations
include the repetitious nature of the alleged violations, the impact of these violations on the
charging party, and the impact on the public interest. Id. See text accompanying notes 38-
58 infra.
31 See generally Solien v. Merchants Home Delivery Service, Inc., 557 F.2d 622, 625 (8th
Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Acker Indus., Inc., 460 F.2d 649, 652 (10th Cir. 1972); Squillacote v. Local
248 Meat & Allied Food Workers, 390 F. Supp. 1180, 1183 (D.C. Wis. 1975).
11 Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Boire
v. Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 788 (5th Cir. 1973); Schauffler v. Local 1291, 292 F.2d 182, 187
(3d Cir. 1961).
" If reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have been committed were
the only criteria used to determine the propriety of petitions requesting 10(j) injunctions,
injunctions would routinely be issued. 29 U.S.C. § 1606) (1976). Virtually every court, how-
ever, recognizes the labor injunction as an extraordinary remedy and looks to criteria other
than reasonable cause. See note 37 supra.
" 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976); see note 28 supra. See also Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1975).
n The three most commonly used standards employed in granting or denying 10(j) peti-
tions are whether absent injunctive relief: (1) the purposes of the NLRA will be frustrated,
see text accompanying notes 46-51 infra; (2) irreparable harm will accrue to the complainant,
see text accompanying notes 52-54 infra; and (3) the status quo ultimately will be preserved
for administrative resolution of the unfair labor practice allegations. See text accompanying
1979]
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inquiry is intended to ensure the ultimate efficacy of Board remedies and
each utilizes many of the same analytical criteria used by the Board."
Courts seldom have applied these bases of inquiry uniformly, however, and
often have reached contradictory results using similar criteria. 5
The first basis of inquiry used by the courts is whether the dircumstan-
ces of the case demonstrate that the purposes of the NLRA will be frus-
trated absent injunctive relief." Determining what constitutes frustration
of the Act is difficult.47 In Angel v. Sacks, 1 the Tenth Circuit held that if
the circumstances of the case create a reasonable fear that the efficacy of
a final Board order may be nullified or the administrative procedure ren-
dered meaningless, the purposes of the Act would be frustrated and 10(j)
injunctive relief would be appropriate. Other courts have looked to the
ineffectiveness of alternative remedies as a primary factor in deteimining
that the purposes of the Act will be frustrated. 9 While this inquiry seems
to be in accord with the legislative intent underlying section 10(j) relief,"
the lack of uniform application leads to inconsistent findings and illus-
trates the need for a more definitive set of standards.'
The second basis of inquiry is whether irreparable harm will accrue to
the complainant absent injunctive relief.52 This test is merely an extension
of the frustration of the Act standard. 3 Allowing the rights of an aggrieved
party to be affected irreparably by unfair labor practices also frustrates the
purposes of the Act. Courts tend to treat irreparable harm, however, as a
separate standard. In a Gissel situation, the primary consideration under
the irreparable harm standard is whether the union's support will be dissi-
pated to such an extent that the Board's normal remedial procedures
would be inadequate to protect the employees' interests. 4 The difficulty
notes 55-58 infra. See generally Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1188-89
(5th Cir. 1975); Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1975).
1 See note 38 supra.
Compare Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975) (injunction
denied) with Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975) (injunction granted).
16 E.g., Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975); Angel v. Sacks, 382 F.2d
655, 660 (10th Cir. 1967).
11 Placed in a Gissel context and carried to its logical extreme, the purposes of the Act
would always be frustrated whenever an employer refused to bargain because such a refusal
would inherently impede the collective bargaining process which the NLRA seeks to promote.
- 382 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir. 1967). The employer in Angel had discharged nearly one-
third of his work force and subsequently had doubled the size of his staff in order to preclude
unionization. The Tenth Circuit concluded that absent injunctive relief, this conduct would
constitute frustration of the purposes of the NLRA. Id.
1, E.g., Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 39 (2d Cir. 1975); see text accompanying
notes 71-79 infra.
m See note 33 supra.
51 See note 45 supra and text accompanying notes 59-80 infra.
12 E.g., McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir. 1966); Fuchs v. Steel-
Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 385, 387 (D. Mass. 1973). Fuchs involved a Gissel situation (see text
accompanying notes 19-27 supra) in which the union alleged that § 8(a)(1), § 8(a)(3) and §
8(a)(5) violations had occurred. See note 10 supra. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) & (5) (1978).
0 See Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, supra note 2, at 848-85.
54 See note 26 supra.
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of such a determination is that the courts must judge in advance the
ultimate effect than an employer's refusal to bargain will have on the
union. The lack of a clearly delineated standard that deterinines the cir-
cumstances under which a refusal to bargain would cause irreparable harm
contributes to inconsistent decisions.
5
The third basis of inquiry is whether the status quo can be preserved
for administrative resolution absent injunctive relief.6 This criterion must
be considered in relation to the other standards. If irreparable harm will
occur absent injunctive relief, the status quo probably cannot be preserved
and the objectives of the NLRA will be frustrated. Courts generally use a
combination of these standards to make the determination of whether
section 10(j) injunctive relief is appropriate.57 While each standard is sub-
ject to varying interpretations, the preservation of the status quo standard
has proven to be particularly prone to conflicting interpretations and ap-
plications especially when applied to a Gissel-type situation.58
Two 1975 circuit court decisions illustrate the conflicting interpreta-
tions which can arise when applying the standards of inquiry in Gissel
situations. In Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,9 the Fifth Circuit re-
fused to compel bargaining under section 10(). The case exemplifies the
Gissel fact situation."0 Petitioned for a 10(j) injunction, the district court
determined on the basis of the evidence that there was reasonable cause
to believe that unfair labor practices had occured," and on appeal the Fifth
Circuit concurred."2 The district court issued an injunction against the
commission of future unfair labor practices but refused to order the rein-
statement of discharged employees or to compel collective bargaining
under section 10j). In affirming the district court's action, the Fifth Cir-
cuit emphasized that measures to circumvent the NLRB's processes
13 Compare Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1975) with
Smith v. Old Angus, Inc., 82 L.R.R.M. 2930, 2936 (D.C. Md. 1973); Seeler v. Trading Port,
Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 39 (2d Cir. 1975), and text accompanying notes 59-80 infra.
" E.g., 515 F.2d at 1185; 82 L.R.R.M. at 2931. Both Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.
and Smith v. Old Angus, Inc., involved Gissel-type situations. See text accompanying notes
19-27 supra.
" E.g., 515 F.2d at 1185 (irreparable harm and status quo); 517 F.2d at 33 (frustration
of the purposes of the Act, irreparable harm and status quo).
" See text accompanying notes 59-80 infra. The conflicting interpretations of the status
quo standard indicate basic policy differences between the courts. The differences focus
primarily on the courts' view of the unionization process and on the courts' view of their role
in the labor dispute resolution process. See text accompanying notes 67-70 & 77-80 infra.
51 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Id. In Trading Port, the Teamsters attempted organization of a newly extended freight
operation of Pilot Freight. Pilot Freight subsequently engaged in violations of §§ 8(a)(1), (3)
and (5) of the NLRA which included coercive threats, firings and wage increases to deter
unionization. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) & (5) (1976). 515 F.2d at 1190. The union filed un-
fair labor practice charges against the company and a certification election was never held.
Subsequently, the NLRB petitioned the district court for a 100) injunction to enjoin the
commission of unfair labor practices, to reinstate discharged employees and to compel collec-
tive bargaining. 515 F.2d at 1189.
" 86 L.R.R.M. 2976, 2978-79 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
515 F.2d at 1185, 1191.
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should be employed sparingly." The court stated that the injunction issued
by the district court would prohibit the commission of unfair labor prac-
tices in the future and thus adequately would protect the employees' inter-
ests because the employers could be held in contempt if they attempted
to dissipate union strength in any unlawful manner."
The Fifth Circuit justified this position on several grounds. The court
reasoned that the union, although claiming a card majority, 5 had never
enjoyed a bargaining relationship with the employer.6 Since the signing of
union authorization cards precipitated the controversy, the Pilot Freight
court defined the status quo to be preserved as that period prior to any
union activity. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that an interim bargaining order
materially would alter the status quo by creating judicially a relationship
that had not existed previously.67 The court suggested that the issuance of
an injunction compelling an employer who alledgedly has committed un-
fair labor practices to bargain collectively with an uncertified union would
be a judicial usurpation of the NLRB's authority as fact finder and enfor-
cer of the statutory scheme." In addition, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
a continuation of the non-bargaining relationship would not affect the
union so deleteriously that it could not recover. 9 The Pilot Freight court
did not attempt, however, to set forth the continuing effects non-
bargaining would have on an ultimate certification election or on the
union's viability.
70
In Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., the Second Circuit adopted a far differ-
" Id. at 1192.
" Id. at 1193.
93 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
515 F.2d at 1193.
' Id. at 1194.
Id. The court stated that a bargaining order would have to rest on the assumption that
unfair labor practices occurred, despite the fact that the Board had yet to make such findings.
Id.
'Id.
7o Two other cases had been decided previously in accordance with the Fifth Circuit's
rationale in Trading Port. In Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 385 (D. Mass. 1973), the
organizing union lost a certification election and subsequently alleged that Steel-Fab had
committed §§ 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) violations of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) & (5)
(1976). See note 10 supra. The NLRB petitioned the district court for a temporary injunction
pursuant to § 10(j) of the NLRA to compel Steel-Fab to bargain with the union and to enjoin
the commission of unfair labor practices in the future. The district court found that there
was substantial evidence that Steel-Fab had violated the NLRA. 356 F. Supp. at 387. The
court refused to grant the petition for injunctive relief, however, stating that 10(j) was an
extraordinary remedy to be used only when necessary to preserve the status quo while an
action is pending before the NLRB. Id. In denying relief, the district court in Steel-Fab took
the same view of the status quo to be protected as the Fifth Circuit later took in Trading
Port. See text accompanying notes 71-80 infra. In its decision, the Steel-Fab court cited and
relied upon Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. 2600 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 356 F.
Supp. at 387. In Lawrence Rigging, the district court, faced with a typical Gissel situation,
refused to compel interim bargaining on the grounds that such relief would not be timely,
would not preserve the status quo, and would infringe upon the statutorily mandated powers
of the NLRB. 80 L.R.R.M. at 2604-05.
71 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ent approach in its resolution of an analogous dispute. Faced with a typical
Gissel situation," the Second Circuit reversed the district court and com-
pelled collective bargaining by means of a 10() injunction. After determin-
ing, as did the district court, that reasonable cause existed to find that
unfair labor practices had been committed, the Second Circuit concluded
that the specific injunctive relief requested by the NLRB was just and
proper.3 In making its determination, the Second Circuit used basically
the same analytical criteria as did the Fifth Circuit in Pilot Freight but
reached a far different conclusion.
The court reasoned that interim bargaining order relief was necessary
to effectuate employee rights." The court determined that absent injunc-
tive relief, irreparable harm might be done to the union. 5 The court found
that only through the issuance of an interim bargaining order could the
union's viability be maintained to the degree necessary to make final
Board adjudication in the form of an election or a bargaining order mean-
ingful.
7 1
The Trading Port court also considered preservation of the status quo
as an important determining factor, although the Second Circuit defined
the status quo much differently than did the Fifth Circuit.77 The Second
Circuit stated that the status quo to be protected by section 10(j) is not
the status quo which has emerged as a result of the unfair labor practices
being litigated.78 Rather, section 10(j) should preserve or restore the status
quo as it existed before the onset of the unfair labor practices. 7 The
Trading Port court sought to re-establish the union's alleged majority and
72 The union always claims to have had a majority of signed authorization cards in a
Gissel-type situation. In Seeler, the employer, Trading Port, refused to recognize or bargain
with the union and engaged in §§ 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) violations which included threats of
job loss, coercive interrogation of employees, promises of benefits if the employees abandoned
the union, and discrimination against union supporters in rehiring practices. 29 U.S.C. §§
158(a)(1), (3) & (5) (1976). 517 F.2d at 35, 36. The union lost a certification election, filed
objections to the election and charged Trading Port with unfair labor practices. The NLRB
subsequently issued a complaint against Trading Port and petitioned the district court for
injunctive relief. Id. at 36. The district court granted the injunctive relief for unfair labor
practices only, but refused to order collective bargaining. Id.
See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
" 517 F.2d at 37, 38.
7' In determining that irreparable damage might be done to the union, the court con-
cluded that the damage could not be remedied by either a cease and desist order or an
ultimate Gissel bargaining order from the Board. Id. at 37-40.
"1 Id. at 40. Having concluded that the interim bargaining orders were proper where the
union once had a clear majority and that the employer engaged in such egregious unfair labor
practices as to make a fair election virtually impossible, the Second Circuit remanded the
case to the district court for a factual determination as to the seriousness of the unfair labor
practices involved. Id.
17 See text accompanying notes 59-70 supra.
,1 517 F.2d at 38. The Second Circuit viewed its role in the dispute resolution process as
a primarily restorative function. The court sought to reestablish conditions as they existed
prior to the onset of the alleged unfair labor practices.
79 Id.
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to validate that status by requiring the employer to bargain with the
union."0
The Trading Port decision clearly represents a different orientation
than does the Pilot Freight decision. The Fifth Circuit, in Pilot Freight,
chose to give controlling weight to the fact that in Gissel situations, the
union's majority status has never been certified and the unfair labor prac-
tice allegations against the employer have never been proven.," The Second
Circuit, in Trading Port, chose to give controlling weight to the possibility
that in Gissel situations the employer may have engaged in such egregious
unfair labor practices that the statutory rights of the employees to organize
freely may not be protected by the normal administrative procedures. The
Second Circuit thus did not hesitate to legitimize a bargaining relationship
that never previously existed. 8
The divergent opinions expressed in Pilot Freight and Trading Port
raise legitimate questions as to the effectiveness of compelled bargaining
under section 10(j) in Gissel situations. Since a 10(j) injunction can only
provide a temporary bargaining order, the normal administrative proceed-
ings of the NLRB must continue." While the employer is forced to bargain
with the union, the unfair labor practice allegations will be litigated
10 In Smith v. Old Angus, Inc., 82 L.R.R.M. 2931 (D. Md. 1973), the district court
reached a result similar to the Trading Port decision. After the organizing union had obtained
signed authorization cards from 27 of 50 employees, the employer Old Angus, had allegedly
engaged in violations of §§ 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the NLRA. See note 10 supra. These alleged
violations included the coercive interrogation of employees concerning suspected union activ-
ity, the discharge of union sympathizers, and the distribution of a document discouraging
unionization. 82 L.R.R.M. at 2932, 2934. The NLRB, pursuant to § 10(j) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 160(6) (1976), petitioned for an injunction to enjoin the commission of future unfair
labor practices, to reinstate discharged employees, and to require Old Angus to bargain in
good faith with the organizing union. Id. at 2931. No certification election was held. The
district court granted the NLRB's petition on the following grounds: (1) the signed authoriza-
tion cards were a valid indication that the union had once enjoyed majority status; (2) there
was reasonable cause to believe that Old Angus had violated the NLRA; (3) an injunction
was just and proper to prevent frustration of the NLRA; and (4) an injunction was necessary
to preserve the status quo which existed at the time the unfair labor practices had begun.
Id. at 2935-38.
1 The Pilot Freight decision is indicative of judicial hesitancy to interfere seriously with
the normal administrative procedures of the NLRB. By refusing to adopt § 10(j) injunctions
as a proper means of compelling interim bargaining when reasonable cause exists to believe
that an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices and the union claims to have a
majority, the Fifth Circuit attached very little significance to the union's claimed majority
status. By defining the status quo to be preserved as that period prior to any union activity,
the Pilot Freight court clearly indicated that the primary responsibility for the resolution of
labor disputes lies in the hands of the NLRB and not with the courts.
32 The Trading Port decision indicates judicial concern for protecting the § 7 rights of
employees. See note 1 supra. By adopting § 10() as a proper mechanism for compelling
interim bargaining in a Gissel-type situation, the Second Circuit placed primary emphasis
on the possible effects that the commission of serious unfair labor practices might have on
the employees' right to freely select their representatives.
10 The normal NLRB proceedings include hearings, administrative law judge decisions,
approval or disapproval of an NLRB bargaining order, and possible enforcement proceedings
in a court of appeals. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.10-.15 (1978).
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through normal Board procedures."4 This resolution mechanism raises
doubts as to whether the parties will bargain seriously knowing that ulti-
mately the NLRB may determine that bargaining is not warranted-. This
concern is especially relevant since the employer already may have demon-
strated his unwillingness to accept the union as the representative of his
employees by resorting to unfair practices."8 In addition, at the time the
10j) injunction is issued, there have been no actual determinations of the
validity or accuracy of the alleged violations.n Thus, an employer might
feel that he is being forced to bargain prior to a hearing of the case. Insofar
as a section 10(j) injunction is designed to remedy the problems created
by the delays inherent in the Board's administrative procedures, its effec-
tiveness will be severely impaired, if not completely frustrated, by insin-
cerity at the bargaining table. That this insincerity may be caused by lack
of finality in the court's decision further emphasizes the inadequacy of
compelled interim bargaining under section 100).m A determined employer
possibly could avoid the sanctions of a section 10(j) injunction compelling
bargaining, thus rendering the bargaining order ineffective.89
A more serious problem would arise should the Board ultimately con-
clude that a bargaining order is not appropriate. Once compelled by sec-
tion 10(j) to bargain with an uncertified union, an employer's relationship
with his employees would be altered in such a way as to preclude a return
to a pre-bargaining situation. If the Board subsequently concludes that
bargaining is not warranted, a return to the status quo would be impossi-
ble, even if one accepts the Second Circuit's definition of the status quo
14 See note 15 supra; see also text accompanying note 24 supra.
'm The NLRB is not bound by a district court's finding as to the propriety of compelled
bargaining.
U If, in addition to committing §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) violations, see note 10 supra, the
employer has committed § 8(a)(5) violations by illegally refusing to bargain with the union,
the concern that the employer will not bargain seriously pursuant to a bargaining order is
given further support. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (3) (1976).
0 The district court's decision in granting or denying injunctive relief is not a decision
on the merits. See Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 385, 386 (D. Mass. 1973).
" While an employer may be held in contempt for violations of an injunction compelling
bargaining, the union must prove failure to bargain in good faith. This proof may be difficult
if the employer has tactfully avoided his bargaining responsibilities through insincere bar-
gaining. In any case, the protracted litigation involved will only delay the processes the
injunction was supposed to expedite.
It has been suggested that an employer might be able to avoid the sanctions of a §
10(j) 'injunction compelling bargaining by allowing a certification election and then refusing
to bargain with the newly certified union. See Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, supra note 3, at 861.
Should the union file an unfair labor practice complaint, the employer would merely raise
unsubstantial defenses, thus further delaying the bargaining responsibility. Id.
"Arguably, the issuance of a § 10(j) injunction which compels an employer to bargain
with an uncertified union could generate the support necessary to obtain majority status. See
Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, supra note 3, at 859. Aided by the judicially imposed bargaining
relationship, the union could conceivably prevail despite never actually having received ma-
jority support prior to the -issuance of the bargaining order. This concern is especially relevant
given that union authorization cards may not be valid indicators of employee sentiment. See
note 2 supra.
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to be protected." Employee regard for the union as a representative of
employee interests would be enhanced through the image conveyed by the
bargaining relationship. While arguably a proper objective of section
10(j), 92 such enhancement only can be proper if the Board subsequently
determines that the bargaining relationship itself is proper. Absent such a
finding by the NLRB, a section 10(j) injunction which compels bargaining
unduly would disadvantage the employer, 3 and effectively would result in
an alteration of the status quo which 10(j) injunctions are purported to
protect. 4 Compelled bargaining under section 10(j) indeed may create by
judicial fiat a relationship that never existed.
The problems which may arise as a result of an improperly created
bargaining relationship are magnified if the union and the employer reach
a settlement during the period that the 10(j) injunction compelling bar-
gaining is in force but prior to an NLRB determination that bargaining is
not warranted. The embodiment of such a settlement in a signed agree-
ment and implementation of the agreement irreparably would harm the
interests of the employer. Even if the agreement is made contingent on the
Board's ultimate findings,95 that such an agreement once existed inevitably
would work to the union's benefit, either in a certification election or in
future unionization attempts. A 10() injunction compelling bargaining
with an uncertified union neither preserves the status quo nor adequately
protects the legitimate rights of the employer.
In addition, the issuance of a 10(j) injunction which compels bargaining
essentially causes judicial displacement of NLRB determinations. A 10(j)
" See text accompanying note 79 supra.
A § 10(j) injunction theoretically is only an interim remedy, the purpose of which is
to preserve the status quo for administrative adjudication. Thus, in a Gissel situation, the
fact that the bargaining relationship created by a § 10(j) injunction may enhance employee
regard for the union is arguably a proper indirect result of the injunction, especially in light
of the alleged unfair labor practices. See Pettibone, The Section 10(j) Bargaining Order In
Gissel-Type Cases, 27 LAB. L.J. 648, 657 (1976).
Despite not being a legitimate representati'e of the employees at the time of the
issuance of the 10(j) bargaining order, the union will have taken on the appearance of legiti-
macy during the period of compelled bargaining. The positive effect that this might have
on the employees' attitude toward collective representation would afford the union a distinct
advantage previously not possessed.
" The Fifth Circuit raised the fear that the status quo would be altered in denying
bargaining order relief in Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1194 (5th Cir.
1975).
p See Ferguson-Steere Motor Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1079 (1975).
An agreement inherently will contain provisions beneficial to the employees and will
reflect the ability of the union to successfully bargain collectively on behalf of the employees.
Even if the agreement is subsequently set aside because bargaining was found to be unwar-
ranted, the impact of such an understanding will be difficult to negate once agreed to by the
employer. The employees will not easily forget the ability of the union to procure benefits
even if the employer unilaterally grants the benefits acquired under the invalidated agree-
ment. While a desirable objective may be to increase employee awareness of the potential
benefits of union membership, this objective should be accomplished through the union's
activity and not through a bargaining relationship which may not have been justified.
An employer has a legitimate right to refuse to bargain with a union which has not
been certified as the legitimate representative of the employees. See note 4 supra.
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injunction issued in a Gissel situation, in effect, transfers to the courts the
NLRB's authority over certain unfair labor practice complaints. Unlike an
injunction which merely enjoins the commission of unfair labor practices
in the future, a court issued injunction which compels bargaining with an
uncertified union inherently must reflect many determinations which
should be reserved for the NLRB1" To issue a 10(j) injunction compelling
bargaining, the district court first must conclude that the authorization
cards upon which the union bases its claim of support are reliable and are
a valid indication that a majority of employees within a proper bargaining
unit favor unionization." If the union has no valid claim to prior majority
support, a bargaining order could not be warranted. The district court also
must decide on the basis of the authorization cards to accept the union as
the exclusive representative of the employees. The resolution of these fac-
tual determinations should be left to the administrative expertise of the
NLRB."00
An even greater encroachment on the Board's authority occurs in the
district court's finding that a 10(j) injunction granting bargaining order
relief is just and proper. While no clear or uniform standards exist to guide
the courts in determining that the relief requested is just and proper, the
courts must essentially make a Gissel determination as to the ultimate
effects of the alleged unfair labor practices."' Prior to the issuance of a 10()
injunction, the district court will look to the alleged section 8(a) (1) and (3)
violations"2 to determine if the union's viability can be protected ade-
quately absent bargaining order relief. The NLRB must make this same
determination in its later administrative proceedings. In addition, the alle-
gations which precipitate the controversy have never been proven and are
not proven before the district court. Rather, the district court only must
determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices
have occurred,"'3 and then attempt to judge the effects that the alleged
practices might have in the future. Such court determinations circumvent
the administrative procedures of the NLRB. As the Fifth Circuit asserted
in Pilot Freight, the scope of section 10(j) should not overpower the orderly
procedures of the Board."'4
While the NLRB is not bound by the district court's findings,"5 the
" The Board was created to determine the appropriateness of bargaining units, to inves-
tigate disputes as to whether representation exists, to direct, supervise, and certify the results
of representation elections, and to grant appropriate relief from unfair labor practices. 29
U.S.C. § 153 (1976). The NLRB, as the expert administrative authority in labor related
matters, is inherently in a better position than the courts to make the informed judgments
that are required to determine whether a bargaining order is warranted. See NLRB v. Seven-
Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-52 (1953).
" Gissel allows a finding of majority support based on authorization cards. 395 U.S. at
595, 601-10. See also note 20 supra.
1" See note 98 supra.
' See note 10 supra; see also 517 F.2d at 33, 38.
'° See note 10 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
"' 515 F.2d at 1192.
" NLRB v. Acker Indus., Inc., 460 F.2d 649, 652-53 (10th Cir. 1972). The NLRB is not
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Board may be predisposed to issue a 10(c) bargaining order'6 in its later
adjudicative proceedings.' 7 Such a predisposition is likely given that the
Board instituted the 10(j) proceedings on the belief that injunctive relief
was necessary.0 8 In addition, the district court's initial issuance of a 10(j)
injunction compelling bargaining may have a similar predisposing effect
in the subsequent enforcment proceedings which would inevitably follow
a final Board order.' 9 Essentially, the issuance of a 10(j) injunction com-
pelling bargaining in Gissel situations would result in the courts having
assumed the role of primary arbiter in certain NLRA enforcement proceed-
ings.11
0
The NLRB has been hesitant to seek section 10(j) injunctions to compel
bargaining where an employer allegedly has committed unfair labor prac-
tices against an uncertified union claiming to have had signed authoriza-
tion cards from a majority of employees."' Gissel situations present serious
problems, however, in protecting the legitimate rights of the parties in-
volved, and the present administrative procedures and remedies do not
appear capable of providing workable solutions. Nevertheless, the answer
does not lie in extensive use of section 100) to compel bargaining. The
inequities of the injunctive remedy when used to mandate bargaining ulti-
mately would result in the courts becoming the arbiters of NLRA claims
in Gissel situations. Such displacement of the Board's authority is not in
line with the legislative intent behind section 10(j)"2 nor is it wise given
the abilities and expertise of the NLRB in labor related matters."2 A sub-
stantive revision of the administrative processes is a preferable solution.
Since time delays presently inherent in the NLRB's procedures are at the
heart of the Gissel dilemma, revision of these procedures to expedite the
handling of Gissel-type complaints would eliminate the need for section
10(j) bargaining orders. Increasing the number of administrative law
judges, giving the utmost priority to cases involving alleged serious Gissel
precluded from reaching conclusions contrary to those reached by the district court. The
district court's findings are not dispositive on the nierits, but are significant only insofar as
they grant or deny interim relief.
" See note 8 supra.
7 See 515 F.2d at 1185. In Trading Port, the Board subsequently issued a § 10(c)
bargaining order as part of its final decision and order. Id.
' See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
110 See Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, supra note 2, at 862.
" See note 33 supra. The NLRB currently only petitions for § 10(j) injunctions to compel
bargaining in a very limited number of cases each year. Yet, the NLRB considers the § 10(j)
injunction to compel bargaining as a viable alternative in attempting to provide the most
effective remedy possible in labor disputes. Thus, the NLRB will not hesitate to seek 10(j)
injunctions to compel bargaining, especially in light of the Second Circuit's decision in Seeler
v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975). The Board, of course, does not agree with
the view of the Fifth Circuit in Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir.
1975). Letter from John H. Fanning, Chairman, National Labor Relations Board, to James
P. Osick (Jan. 31, 1979).
112 See note 35 supra.
" See note 98 supra.
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violations, requiring reasonable yet expeditious time limits within the
administrative process, and petitioning promptly for section 10(j) injunc-
tions to prohibit the continuation of unfair labor practices markedly would
reduce the time delays involved. A solution which attacks the very cause
of the time delay problem is more reasonable than a remedy which requires
judicial interference with the administrative agency explicitly created to
deal with labor related matters. Expediting the administrative procedures
* would preserve the jurisdiction of the NLRB over unfair labor practices,
eliminate the inequities of compelled bargaining under section 10(), and
thus more adequately protect the legitimate rights of all the parties in-
volVed.
JAMS P. OSIcK

